Frankfurt cases are a family of thought experiments introduced by the philosopher Harry Frankfurt in 1969 to challenge the principle of alternate possibilities, the widely held view that a person is morally responsible for an action only if that person could have done otherwise. In Frankfurt's original scenario, a character named Jones is going to perform some action, and a manipulator named Black stands ready to intervene and force Jones to perform that same action if Jones shows any sign of choosing differently, but because Jones freely chooses the action on his own, Black never actually needs to intervene. Frankfurt argues that Jones is nonetheless morally responsible for what he does, even though, because of Black's readiness to intervene, Jones could not actually have done otherwise, which would mean that moral responsibility does not require the ability to have done otherwise after all. If Frankfurt's cases succeed, they open a path for compatibilists to defend the coexistence of moral responsibility and determinism without having to redefine what could have done otherwise means.
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Position KindSourced to the subject's own account Origin YearSourced to the subject's own account Sources
1. Frankfurt Cases (Wikipedia)
WikipediaFrankfurt cases (Wikipedia), bibliography, Frankfurt 1969
Frankfurt, Harry (1969). Alternate possibilities and moral responsibility. Journal of Philosophy. 66 (23): 829-839.
Frankfurt cases (Wikipedia), introduction
Frankfurt cases (also known as Frankfurt counterexamples or Frankfurt-style cases) were presented by philosopher Harry Frankfurt in 1969 as counterexamples to the principle of alternate possibilities.
View the Source Frequently Asked Questions
If Black stands ready to force Jones to act, how can Frankfurt still say Jones is morally responsible for what he does?
Because Black never actually intervenes; Jones freely chooses the action on his own, so Frankfurt holds that responsibility does not require the ability to have done otherwise.
Frankfurt can still call Jones responsible because Black never actually needs to intervene: Jones freely chooses to perform the action on his own before Black's readiness ever comes into play. Frankfurt argues that what matters for moral responsibility is how Jones actually came to act, not the separate fact that an alternative was closed off in the background by Black's readiness to intervene. Because Jones is responsible even though, thanks to Black, he could not actually have done otherwise, Frankfurt concludes that moral responsibility does not require the ability to have done otherwise after all, which opens a path for compatibilists to defend the coexistence of moral responsibility and determinism.
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