The Sorites paradox, sometimes called the paradox of the heap, is a paradox that arises from the vagueness of ordinary predicates. Its typical formulation begins with a heap of sand from which grains are removed one at a time, on the assumption that removing a single grain never turns a heap into a non-heap; repeating this assumption enough times leads to the conclusion that a single remaining grain, or even no grains at all, must still count as a heap, which conflicts with ordinary usage of the word. The paradox forces the question of exactly when, if ever, the heap stopped being a heap, exposing the difficulty of applying vague predicates precisely across a continuous series of small changes.
Facts
Origin YearSourced to the subject's own accountApproximate; the Sorites paradox own Wikipedia article attributes it to Eubulides of Miletus without restating his dates, so the year here is drawn from the separate Eubulides article, floruit 4th century BCE. Connections
Open Questions
Source Sorites Paradox (Wikipedia)
Sources
1. Eubulides (Wikipedia)
WikipediaEubulides Wikipedia introductionQuote, Eubulides Wikipedia introduction
Eubulides of Miletus was a philosopher of the Megarian school who is famous for his paradoxes.
Sorites Paradox (Wikipedia)
WikipediaSorites paradox Wikipedia introductionQuote, Sorites paradox Wikipedia introduction
The Sorites paradox, sometimes known as the paradox of the heap, is a paradox that results from vague predicates.
Open Questions (1 open question)
Which proposed solution to the sorites paradox, if any, is correct?
Philosophers have proposed several competing treatments of the paradox: denying that any fixed grain count marks a heap, fixing a stipulated boundary, epistemicism (a real but unknowable boundary, held by Timothy Williamson and Roy Sorensen), supervaluationism, many-valued logics, fuzzy logic, and Diana Raffman's hysteresis account. The sourced Wikipedia article lists all of these as live, competing proposals with no stated resolution among them.
What would resolve this A decisive argument, or a real convergence of expert opinion, establishing that one treatment of vague predicates (a bivalent account with a real or stipulated boundary, a many-valued or fuzzy-logic account, or a context-dependent account such as hysteresis) is correct and the competing accounts mistaken.
philosophy of logic and language (vagueness)Sorites Paradox (Wikipedia)
Frequently Asked Questions
Is there an agreed solution to the sorites paradox?
No. Philosophers have proposed several competing treatments, including denying any fixed heap/non-heap boundary exists, epistemicism (a real but unknowable boundary), supervaluationism, many-valued and fuzzy logic, and hysteresis, with no consensus on which is correct.
The paradox arises because removing one grain from a heap never seems, on its own, to turn a heap into a non-heap, yet repeating that step enough times empties the heap entirely. Proposed responses include treating any collection above some threshold count as a heap by stipulation; epistemicism, under which Timothy Williamson and Roy Sorensen hold that a sharp boundary exists but can never be known; supervaluationism; many-valued logics that add a third, indeterminate status between heap and non-heap; fuzzy logic, which assigns heap-ness a continuous value between 0 and 1; and hysteresis, introduced by Diana Raffman, under which what counts as a heap depends on the collection's own prior history. None of these has become the settled answer; this atlas records the open question rather than picking a side.
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