The fine-tuning argument draws on the fine-tuned universe hypothesis, the observation that life as it actually exists could not have arisen if certain physical constants of nature, such as the charge of the electron or the strength of gravity, had been even slightly different from their actual values. Roughly thirty-one physical constants appear together in the Standard Model of particle physics and the standard cosmological model, and proponents of the argument hold that the apparently unusual precision of these constants and the initial conditions of the universe around the Big Bang, which together allowed life to emerge and evolve, is best explained by an intentional tuning of the universe for life rather than by chance alone.
Facts
Origin YearMarks Brandon Carters 1974 formulation of the anthropic principle, the earliest work the cited SEP article references on this topic. Classification
Position Kind Sources
1. Fine-Tuning (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
Stanford Encyclopedia of PhilosophyFine-Tuning (SEP), bibliography reference to Carter 1974
Carter 1974
Fine-Tuning (SEP), introduction
The term fine-tuning refers to situations where certain phenomena of interest depend sensitively on parameter values falling within extremely narrow ranges.
View the Source Dissenting Readings (1 dissenting reading)
Description
The inverse gambler's fallacy charge against the multiverse reply to fine-tuning: White (2000) and others (Draper, Landsman among them) argue it is a fallacy to suppose that the existence of many other universes makes it more likely that this observed universe is life-permitting, since the only evidence in hand is the narrower fact that conditions are right for life in this universe, which the number of other universes does not affect.
A dissenting reading, from Roger WhiteFine-Tuning (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Frequently Asked Questions
Does appealing to a multiverse answer the fine-tuning argument?
Critics say the multiverse reply commits the inverse gambler's fallacy: the existence of many other universes cannot make it more likely that THIS observed universe is life-permitting.
One common reply to the fine-tuning argument is that if there are enough other universes with differing physical constants, it becomes likely that at least one would permit life, and unsurprising that we find ourselves in that one. Critics, including Roger White (2000), along with Paul Draper and Klaas Landsman among others named in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy's Fine-Tuning entry, accuse this reply of committing the inverse gambler's fallacy: "supposing that the existence of many other universes makes it more likely that this one, the only one that we have observed, will be life-permitting." On this objection, the relevant evidence is only the narrower fact that conditions are right for life HERE, in this universe, and the sheer number of other universes does nothing to make that fact more likely.
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