The free will defense is Alvin Plantinga's response to the logical problem of evil, the claim advanced by philosophers such as J.L. Mackie that the existence of evil is logically incompatible with a God who is omnipotent, omniscient and wholly good. Plantinga argues that Mackie never established an explicit contradiction between these claims, since omnipotence means only the power to do what is logically possible, and it is not logically possible even for God to guarantee that genuinely free creatures always choose rightly. He introduces the idea of transworld depravity, the possibility that every possible free creature would go wrong at least once in any world in which it exists, to argue that a world containing free creatures who sometimes do evil may be the best God could actualize while still leaving them free. The defense does not claim to identify God's actual reason for permitting evil, only to show that God's existence is logically compatible with the evil the world contains, shifting the burden onto anyone who claims otherwise to supply the missing premise needed to complete the contradiction.
Facts
Origin YearSourced to the subject's own accountMarks Plantingas earlier 1965 essay The Free Will Defence; the same source states the final, canonical version appeared in his 1977 book God, Freedom, and Evil. Classification
Position KindSourced to the subject's own account Sources
1. Alvin Plantingas Free-Will Defense (Wikipedia)
WikipediaAlvin Plantingas free-will defense (Wikipedia), on the 1965 essay
an earlier version appearing in 1965 in an essay titled The Free Will Defence.
Alvin Plantingas free-will defense (Wikipedia), introduction
Alvin Plantingas free-will defense is a logical argument developed by the American analytic philosopher Alvin Plantinga and published in its final version in his 1977 book God, Freedom, and Evil.
View the Source Frequently Asked Questions
Does Plantinga's free will defense claim to identify God's actual reason for permitting evil?
No. Plantinga argues only that God's existence is logically compatible with the evil the world contains, using the idea of transworld depravity to show a contradiction was never established; he does not claim to know why God actually allows evil.
Plantinga's free will defense responds to the logical problem of evil advanced by philosophers such as J.L. Mackie, who argued that the existence of evil is logically incompatible with a God who is omnipotent, omniscient and wholly good. Plantinga argues that Mackie never established an explicit contradiction between these claims, since omnipotence means only the power to do what is logically possible, and it is not logically possible even for God to guarantee that genuinely free creatures always choose rightly. He introduces the idea of transworld depravity, the possibility that every possible free creature would go wrong at least once in any world in which it exists, to argue that a world containing free creatures who sometimes do evil may be the best God could actualize while still leaving them free. The defense does not claim to identify God's actual reason for permitting evil, only to show that God's existence is logically compatible with the evil the world contains, shifting the burden onto anyone who claims otherwise to supply the missing premise needed to complete the contradiction.
Reader Challenges (0)
No disputes yet. Spotted an error or a better source? Open the first one.
Sign in to dispute this or suggest a correction.
View At A Past Year
Choose a year to see this entry's facts and connections as the atlas records them at that moment: what it held then, what it held instead, and what it had not yet adopted. Choose Present for the current record.