G. E. Moore's argument, from Principia Ethica (1903), against any attempt to define goodness in terms of some natural property, such as pleasure or what is desired. For any proposed naturalistic definition, Moore argues, one can always meaningfully ask is it good? of the property said to define goodness, and the question remains open, non-trivial, in a way it would not be if the definition were correct, since asking is pleasure pleasant? is trivial in a way is pleasure good? is not. Moore concluded that goodness is a simple, unanalysable, non-natural property, and he labelled the error of identifying it with any natural property the naturalistic fallacy, a move that shaped much of twentieth-century metaethics, including later non-cognitivist and expressivist reactions against the idea that moral terms name properties at all.
Facts
Origin YearG. E. Moore, Principia Ethica, 1903, chapter 1. Classification
Position Kind Connections
Associated With
Source G.E. Moore (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
In Branch
Sources
1. G.E. Moore (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
G.E. Moore, section on the open question argument
G.E. Moores Principia Ethica of 1903 is often considered a revolutionary work that set a new agenda for 20th-century ethics.
G.E. Moore, on the open-question argument itself
His main argument against their view was what has come to be known as the open-question argument
- Associated With: G.E. Moore
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