Branches of Philosophy
Philosophy of Action
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Philosophy of action studies what distinguishes a genuine action, such as raising an arm on purpose, from a mere bodily movement or event, such as an arm going up because someone else moved it. It examines the nature of agency, intention and practical reasoning, and asks how an action is properly explained: whether by the causal work of an agent's beliefs and desires, or in some other way that does not reduce the doing to its causal antecedents.
Facts
Central QuestionWhat makes something an action, commonly put through Wittgenstein's formulation: what is left over if one subtracts the fact that an arm goes up from the fact that a person raises that arm? 1 Key DebateCausalism versus anti-causalism about action explanation: Donald Davidson's causal theory holds that an intentional action is explained by its causal connection to a primary reason, a belief-desire pair that both rationalizes and causes the action. Wittgenstein-inspired critics such as A. I. Melden argued instead, through what is called the logical connection argument, that citing a reason gives a fuller characterization of what the agent is doing rather than identifying a separate cause of it, so that reason explanation cannot be assimilated to causal explanation at all. 1 Key DebateWhether action can be analyzed into simpler components: a long tradition, including the standard causal theory, treats an action as decomposable into a bodily movement plus some further factor, such as a triggering belief-desire pair, that turns the movement into a doing. A number of authors, drawing on Elizabeth Anscombe and Aristotle, have argued this additive or decompositional project is bound to fail, holding instead that an action must be understood as a basic unity not reducible to distinct, simpler parts. 1 Cross-Tradition Connections
Sources
1. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Stanford University, Center for the Study of Language and Informationentry: Action, Section 1Quote, entry: Action, Section 1
It is assumed that an account of action can be given in terms of distinct, and simpler components... However, a number of authors have argued that this reductive project is bound to fail.
1. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Stanford University, Center for the Study of Language and Informationentry: Action, Section 2.1Quote, entry: Action, Section 2.1
Melden's central argument is the logical connection argument. According to Melden, since the supposedly causal antecedents of an action (mental items such as desires and intentions) are logically related to the action itself, they cannot be its causes, since Hume held that causes and effects must be logically distinct existences.
1. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Stanford University, Center for the Study of Language and InformationAssociated With: Donald Davidson, entry: Action, Section 2.2Quote, Associated With: Donald Davidson, entry: Action, Section 2.2
Section 2 examines a classic account of intentional action in terms of causation, associated with Donald Davidson's work.
1. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Stanford University, Center for the Study of Language and InformationIncludes: Aristotle, entry: Action, Section 4.1Quote, Includes: Aristotle, entry: Action, Section 4.1
Aristotle imposed epistemic conditions on voluntary and, a fortiori, intentional action: according to him, to act voluntarily one must know, among other things, what one is doing, to whom, and why
1. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Stanford University, Center for the Study of Language and InformationIncludes: Plato, entry: Action, IntroductionQuote, Includes: Plato, entry: Action, Introduction
There is a long-standing tradition in philosophy going back at least as far as Plato and Aristotle that recognizes an important distinction between the acts that (non-human) animals in general are capable of, and the special sorts of actions that human beings do intentionally, such as going to the store, making phone calls, protesting an injustice, or knitting a sweater.
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